We employ a common agency model of policy making to examine how green lobbies affect the determination of trade and environmental policies in two large countries that are linked by trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that the impact of green lobbying on environmental policy outcomes depends crucially on the prevailing trade regime-cooperative or non-cooperative-on whether environmental agencies act in a unilateral or coordinated manner, and on the size of the emission leakages and transboundary spillovers. Under free trade, a unilateral increase in pollution taxes reduces domestic emissions at the cost of increased foreign emissions; in this case, if the emission leakages and the associated transboundary spillovers are large enough, green lobbying can create a bias towards lower pollution taxes. 
. Introduction
This paper examines how the presence of green lobbies may affect the determination of trade and environmental policies in large countries linked by trade flows and transboundary pollution.
It is widely recognized that, in the presence of transboundary pollution, uncoordinated environmental regulation at the national level is associated with market failures and that economic efficiency requires international policy cooperation. In the absence of cooperation, there is a presumption that, by exerting political pressure in favor of higher domestic pollution taxes, green lobbies might 1 act as a partial remedy.
In this paper, we argue that, when countries are large and environmental emissions spill over to trading partners, the presumption that green lobbying must lead to the adoption of stricter environmental policy is potentially misleading. This is because an increase in pollution taxes by a large country shifts the terms of trade in favor of trading partners, leading to an increase in their emissions. If the effect of domestic policies on foreign emissions (''emission leakages''), and the associated transboundary spillovers are large enough, unilateral efforts to reduce pollution by taxing domestic producers might actually increase environmental degradation and thus be opposed by green lobbies. Since the environmental policy leakage can be eliminated either through the use of import tariffs or through environmental policy coordination, the impact of green lobbying on the environmental policy outcome will also depend crucially on whether or not governments are bound by a free trade agreement and on whether they act in a unilateral or cooperative manner.
The possibility of emission leakages has received attention in various empirical studies on transboundary pollution, which have come to conflicting conclusions about the magnitude of such trade-related environmental effects. Some simulationbased studies find that unilateral actions to curb CO emissions would have
